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Age Stereotypes and Attitudes
Towards Welfare State Arrangements
for the Old: A Multilevel Analysis
Across Twenty-Nine Countries
Ferry Koster
Erasmus	University	Rotterdam
This study investigates whether and how support for welfare state ar-
rangements for the old relate to the stereotypes of the young and the old 
within	society.	It	is	hypothesized	that	the	social	status	that	these	groups	
have	in	society	affect	these	attitudes	through	different	mechanisms,	re-
lating	 to	 the	 deservingness	 criteria	 that	 citizens	 apply.	An	 empirical	
analysis	of	Round	4	of	the	European	Social	Survey	(including	50,009	in-
dividuals	from	29	European	countries)	shows	that:	(1)	the	social	esteem	
of	people	over	70	predicts	support	for	welfare	state	arrangements	for	the	
old;	and	(2)	the	social	esteem	of	people	in	their	20s	has	a	moderate	effect	
on	support	for	these	arrangements.	Hence,	there	is	 little	support	for	a	
generational	conflict.
Key words: population aging, welfare state arrangements for the old, age 
stereotypes, international comparison
 Most countries experience population aging (Lutz, Sand-
erson, & Scherbov, 2008). This demographic development can 
have societal consequences, and many have argued that the 
changing age composition of countries will have an impact 
on the welfare state in the near future (Castles, 2004; Galasso, 
2006). Oftentimes, this expectation focuses on the financial ba-
sis of the welfare state, since funding welfare state provisions 
becomes more difficult as the share of the population that de-
pends on it increases, while the relative number of contributors 
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decreases. Whereas the issues concerning the financial basis are 
highly relevant for the sustainability of the welfare state, pop-
ulation aging may also have social and political consequences, 
as it can ignite a potential conflict between different generations 
(Walker, 1990), which may be particularly the case if social pro-
visions are unequally distributed across age groups (Ozawa & 
Lee, 2011).
 This conflict between the young and the old may not only 
affect the ability of citizens to support each other, which is 
part of the financial sustainability of the welfare state, but also 
their willingness to do that, which reflects the social and po-
litical support required to sustain the welfare state (De Beer & 
Koster, 2009). If aging really intensifies the generational conflict, 
it should be particularly visible with regard to age-related wel-
fare state arrangements benefiting either the young or the old. 
Given that it is likely that the process of aging implies that a 
larger share of the population becomes dependent on such ar-
rangements, from a welfare state sustainability point of view it 
is particularly interesting to investigate welfare state arrange-
ments for the old. The present study addresses this issue. 
 The question of whether and why people support certain 
welfare state arrangements has been extensively studied in the 
field of welfare state attitudes (Svallfors, 2012). Although a lot 
of these studies focus on attitudes towards the welfare state 
in general, these mechanisms and conditions also provide an-
swers to the question why individuals would be in favor of spe-
cific provisions, such as arrangements for the old. The different 
perspectives that these studies have on welfare state attitudes 
are not necessarily mutually exclusive, and in many cases they 
complement each other, leading to the following insights. 
 First, there are theories that mainly emphasize characteristics 
of the benefactor by investigating how individual factors such as 
self-interest, altruism, and people’s ideological positions relate 
to welfare state attitudes (Hasenfeld & Rafferty, 1989; Svallfors, 
1997; Van Oorschot, 2002). The second set of theories focuses 
on the characteristics	of	the	beneficiaries by looking at the impact 
of factors such as deservingness criteria, beliefs about needi-
ness, and perceived levels of misuse of welfare state provisions 
on attitudes towards welfare state arrangements (Gilens, 1995, 
1999; Halleröd, 2004; Van Oorschot, 2006). A third approach ex-
plains welfare state attitudes by taking the relationship between 
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citizens	and	the	government into account, for example by focusing 
on levels of institutional trust and legitimacy in relation to wel-
fare state attitudes (Bay & Pedersen, 2006; Edlund, 2006; Levi 
& Stoker, 2000; Pettersen, 2002). And, a fourth set of theories 
examines how conditions in the social	context, such as welfare 
state regimes, social structures, and national level conditions 
affect welfare state attitudes and solidarity (Andress & Heien, 
2001; Bean & Papadakis, 1993; Blekesaune & Quadagno, 2003; 
Blomberg & Kroll, 1999; Jæger, 2006; Janmaat & Braun, 2009; 
Koster & Kaminska, 2012; Larsen, 2008; Lipsmeyer & Nord-
strom, 2003; Mau & Burkhardt, 2009).
 Based on these prior studies, an explanation of people’s at-
titudes towards welfare state arrangements for the old includes 
factors such as the age of respondents (reflecting self-interest 
explanations), the opinion about elderly people (reflecting de-
servingness criteria), the extent to which people believe that 
the government can overcome generational conflicts (reflecting 
institutional trust), and the age composition of the country (re-
flecting relative positions of the young and the old). Together, 
these explanations provide a relatively complete picture of the 
conditions influencing attitudes towards welfare state arrange-
ments for the old. 
 Nevertheless, there is one part of the explanation that re-
ceived very little attention in the literature on welfare state at-
titudes. Taking into account that contributions to welfare state 
arrangements produce a collective good (Hart & Cowhey, 1977; 
Olson, 1971), the question is how support for such goods de-
pends on the relationship between the benefactors (the contrib-
utors). The literature about collective action acknowledges that 
the willingness to contribute to a collective good is related to 
the interdependence of the actors involved (e.g., Oliver, 1984) 
and this notion may be relevant for the explanation of welfare 
state attitudes, as well.
 Before theorizing how interdependence among benefactors 
affects attitudes towards welfare state arrangements for the old, 
one conceptual difference between the two research traditions 
should be clarified. Studies of collective action tend to concen-
trate on goods that benefit the whole group, meaning that they 
focus on situations of two-sided solidarity where benefactors 
and beneficiaries are not necessarily clearly distinguished (De 
Beer & Koster, 2009; Hechter, 1987). Welfare states, however, 
70 Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
also provide arrangements that do distinguish benefactors 
from beneficiaries, especially if those provisions benefit specific 
groups. This means that both one-sided and two-sided solidar-
ity are important in the production of such a collective good. 
What is more, welfare state provisions can be conceptualized as 
a combination of solidarity between different groups, namely 
(1) solidarity between the benefactors and the beneficiaries and 
(2) solidarity among the benefactors that produce the collective 
good (De Swaan, 1988). 
 Since the issue concerning solidarity between benefactors 
and beneficiaries has been addressed extensively in previous 
studies, the focus in the present study is on the second issue: 
the level of solidarity among the benefactors. It does so by ad-
vancing and testing a model that is closely related to the one 
presented by Rothstein (2001). In Rothstein’s model, support for 
the welfare state is conceived of as a combination of two social 
dilemma situations that the individual citizen faces, namely 
one dilemma concerning the trustworthiness of the govern-
ment (revolving around the question: “will the state deliver 
what it promised?”), and one concerning the trustworthiness of 
all other citizens (where the individual tries to answer the ques-
tion: “will fellow citizens contribute and not misuse the provi-
sions?”) (p. 222). The model presented in this study argues that 
the second dilemma in fact consists of two separate dilemma 
situations by making a distinction between groups of benefac-
tors and beneficiaries. In research about welfare state attitudes, 
this particular aspect of welfare state arrangements remained 
largely implicit.
 This analysis aims at extending the existing literature on 
welfare state attitudes, both theoretically and empirically. The 
first section develops a social esteem theory of solidarity to un-
derstand attitudes towards welfare state arrangements for the 
old. This theory is grounded in theories of collective action, 
assuming bounded rational actors that do not make their de-
cision in isolation but are influenced by the choices of others. 
These individuals are, for example, affected by social structural 
conditions such as norms, customs, and information (Ostrom, 
1998). The following two propositions underlie this theory: (1) 
individuals are willing to contribute to a collective good if they 
believe that others are willing to contribute as well; and (2) the 
perceived social esteem of a group benefiting from the collective 
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good provides information about the willingness of others to 
contribute to that collective good. The first proposition is based 
on the theory of contingent consent (Levi, 1997). While contin-
gent consent theory usually concentrates on levels of trust in 
fellow citizens and the state, the model proposed here focus-
es on a different mechanism that is formulated in the second 
proposition, namely the social esteem that citizens believe that 
fellow citizens assign to the group of beneficiaries. Hence, the 
emphasis is not on the trustworthiness of other citizens but on 
the informational cues that individuals receive concerning the 
likelihood that their fellow citizens will support a welfare state 
arrangement benefiting a specific group.
 Applying these propositions to the topic of people’s attitudes 
towards welfare state arrangements for the old leads to the pre-
diction that individuals are more in favor of such arrangements 
if they believe that fellow citizens assign a higher status to el-
derly people. This prediction is empirically examined by inves-
tigating how status perceptions about two age groups (people 
in their twenties and people of seventy and older) is related to 
people’s attitudes towards welfare state arrangements securing 
a reasonable standard of living for the old. The empirical data 
are taken from Round 4 of the European Social Survey (ESS, 
2008) and include information about 50,009 individuals in 29 
European countries.
Attitudes Towards Welfare State
Arrangements for the Old
Attitudes	Towards	the	Welfare	State	
 Welfare state attitudes reflect the opinions that citizens have 
towards welfare state arrangements. Two defining characteristics 
of these arrangements are that: (1) they are collective means to 
cover individual risks, requiring individual contributions; (2) the 
government organizes both the collection and the distribution 
of the financial resources. Hence, welfare state arrangements 
consist of formal institutional mechanisms to secure the rights 
and obligations of citizens regarding who pays what and who 
receives what. These two core characteristics distinguish welfare 
state arrangements from other means of risk management such 
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as private insurances (e.g., the market) and social support within 
communities or families (Bowles & Gintis, 1996). While private 
insurances consist of voluntary contributions from individuals 
using the market mechanism, welfare state arrangements rely 
on obligatory contributions that are collected through the tax 
system. And, while the organization of community and family 
support is to a large extent voluntary and informal, welfare state 
arrangements are formal institutions.
 The market, communities, and the government provide 
means to cover individual risks, as each of them produces a 
certain level of social protection. From a policy perspective, 
covering individual risks through the government is preferred 
if it leads to comparatively better outcomes compared to the 
market or the community (Koster, 2009; Lindbeck, 2006; Wil-
liamson, 1981). Once set in motion, the resulting policies can 
become path-dependent and self-sustaining over the course 
of time (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Rothstein, 1998). In addition 
to the macro explanation of why governments try to correct 
market and community failures, the literature on welfare state 
attitudes takes a micro perspective by investigating to what ex-
tent and why citizens prefer government intervention to assist 
others rather than (or in addition to) using market or commu-
nity mechanisms, hence emphasizing the role of public opinion 
in the process of legitimizing social policies (Brooks & Manza, 
2006; Burstein, 1998).
 With regard to welfare state legitimacy, it is useful to make 
a distinction between universal and targeted arrangements. 
While the first kind of welfare state system relies on compar-
atively generous entitlements that are available for everyone, 
the latter consists of restricted arrangements that benefit spe-
cific groups (Korpi & Palme, 1998; Lewin & Stier, 2002). Based 
on a self-interest explanation of welfare state support, it may 
be assumed that a universal welfare state receives more public 
support than targeted arrangements as it satisfies the needs of 
more individuals. 
 Nevertheless, public support can diminish both in uni-
versal and in targeted welfare states, but for different reasons. 
Since universal provisions are more extensive, they are more 
costly and may therefore be harder to sustain. What is more, 
since they are based on a system providing support to a rela-
tively large share of the population, some groups can benefit 
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from them, even if citizens are not in favor of it. Thus, if these 
arrangements (also) benefit groups that are regarded as unde-
serving, public support for the universal welfare state may de-
cline (Bay & Pedersen, 2006). 
 In contrast, welfare state arrangements that are targeted at 
specific groups can create a stronger division between contrib-
utors and beneficiaries. Also, for targeted arrangements it holds 
that if the beneficiaries are regarded as deserving, the public 
will be in favor of such provisions. Nevertheless, since fewer 
citizens benefit from the provisions, overall support may be 
lower compared to universal provisions and needs to be more 
strongly based on other motivations than self-interest, as these 
provisions depend more strongly on the willingness of citizens 
to pay for provisions from which they do not directly benefit 
from themselves. As a result, public support for targeted wel-
fare state provisions can diminish if the distance between these 
two groups becomes too big.
Welfare State Arrangements for the Old
 Clearly, welfare state arrangements for the old are neither 
universal nor targeted as such. These arrangements can be or-
ganized as universal provisions (meaning that every citizen 
above a certain age receives benefits) or can consist of targeted 
provisions (only the elderly poor receive benefits). Nevertheless, 
in both cases they are selective in the sense that they benefit 
one particular group in society at a certain point in time (“the 
old”), while they are paid for by another group (“the young”). 
Of course, when the welfare state arrangements are universal, 
chances are higher that the group of benefactors is entitled to 
receive the benefits as they pass a certain age limit, compared to 
the situation in which these provisions are only targeted at the 
elderly poor. 
 Even though this holds true, receiving these benefits in the 
future is not guaranteed for at least two reasons. First, it is not 
sure whether the benefactors will reach the required age. And, 
second, even if they do reach that age, it is not certain wheth-
er the same provisions will still be available. Both uncertainties 
mean that benefactors may contribute to a universal welfare state 
arrangement from which they do not necessarily benefit them-
selves. This means that welfare state arrangements for the old 
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imply that there is a distinction between benefactors and bene-
ficiaries, at least at the present point in time. And, the question 
that follows from this observation is why the benefactors would 
be willing to support the beneficiaries, given this distinction.
 As was outlined in the introduction, there are several ways of 
theorizing the willingness of benefactors to support the welfare 
state. Most of the existing approaches focus on the benefactor, 
or include factors such as characteristics of the beneficiaries, the 
government, or the wider social context. Adding these factors to 
the explanation makes the model more detailed, but it still does 
not fully account for the theoretical idea that the contributions 
of benefactors may be interdependent (Levi, 1997; Rothstein, 
2001; Scholz & Lubell, 1998). To do that, it is necessary to include 
and investigate the assumption that the willingness of citizens 
to support a certain group depends on the willingness of fellow 
citizens to support that group. This theoretical notion leads to an 
additional explanation of welfare state attitudes. 
 Instead of arguing that the welfare state requires solidarity 
between benefactors and beneficiaries, such a theoretical mod-
el states that solidarity among benefactors is also needed. As 
such, this conceptualization reflects the core of collective action 
theories, assuming that individuals do not make their decision 
in complete isolation. Instead, these theories show that the pre-
paredness of individuals to contribute to a collective good de-
pends on the (perception of) behavior and attitudes of others, 
for example, by emphasizing the role of interdependent choices 
(Granovetter, 1978, 1980; Oliver, 1984; Oliver, Marwell, & Teix-
eira, 1985), conditional cooperation (Fisbacher, Gächter, & Fehr, 
2001; Frey & Meier, 2004), norm conformity (Ostrom, 1998, 2000), 
fairness (Arneson, 1982; Elster, 1989; Gould, 1993), and trust be-
tween individuals (Scholz & Lubell, 1998). 
Social Esteem and Solidarity
 These collective action theories focus on the social structur-
al conditions under which individuals are willing to contribute 
to a collective good. Usually, this applies to goods from which 
the contributors can benefit themselves once they are produced. 
This means that situations in which individuals are faced with 
the question whether or not to contribute may run the risk that 
others may free-ride on their contributions. As a result, in such 
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a situation individuals are interested in gathering information 
about the behavior and attitudes of others; for example, they 
may try to monitor the actual contribution to the collective good 
of other individuals or find out whether others are trustworthy 
(Dawes, 1980).
 The situation is slightly different when regarding welfare 
state arrangements for the old as a collective good that is pro-
duced by one group in society while benefiting another group. 
The question that the individual contributors face in this situ-
ation is not so much whether the other contributors are trust-
worthy individuals, but it may be much more informative to 
know the opinions of other individuals about the group of 
beneficiaries. Therefore, if a person believes that fellow citizens 
have a positive image of the other group and believe that they 
are viewed as deserving, they may be expected to be more will-
ing to contribute to that collective good. As such, it is assumed 
that the collective good problem among the contributors can be 
solved indirectly; namely, individuals are willing to contribute 
if they believe that others will contribute as well. The social es-
teem of the group of recipients provides an informational cue 
for individual citizens about the likelihood that others will con-
tribute, and hence decreases the influence of concerns about 
those who are perceived as free-riders. In addition, the reputa-
tion of the beneficiaries may be upheld by norms of reciprocity 
and fairness that further increase the likelihood that each bene-
factor is willing to contribute. 
 From this theoretical argument, it follows that individual 
support for arrangements that benefit others is affected by the 
perception of benefactors about the esteem that others assign 
to the beneficiaries. The social esteem of the group reflects the 
reputation that a group has within society and provides infor-
mation about the likelihood that fellow citizens will be willing 
to support provisions from which that group benefits. These 
theoretical considerations lead us to the first hypothesis about 
support for welfare state arrangements for the old. The higher 
the perceived social esteem of older age groups, the more support for 
welfare	state	arrangements	for	the	old	(Hypothesis	1).
 The first hypothesis states a direct relationship between 
the social esteem of the elderly and support for welfare state 
arrangements for the old. An additional hypothesis is derived 
from the theoretical model. Apart from assuming that a positive 
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perception about the social esteem of the old leads to stronger 
support for welfare state provisions for the old, it may also be 
expected that the esteem of other age groups should not be re-
lated to support for welfare state arrangements for the old. Ac-
cording to the theory proposed in this article, support for these 
arrangements is related to perceptions about the old, and not 
about the esteem of the young. What is more, it can even be 
expected that there is negative relationship between the social 
esteem of younger age groups and support for welfare state ar-
rangement for the old. 
 Given that the budget of governments is restricted, they will 
not have the means to offer extensive provisions to all age groups 
in society. This means that governments need to make choices 
about how to allocate their budget, and as a consequence, if the 
budget for the provisions of one age group increases, the bud-
get for another group decreases. Therefore, the benefactors may 
face a choice regarding their support for welfare state provisions 
for different age groups. This argument can be regarded as an 
extension of the median voter model applied to the provision 
of old age arrangements (Galasso, 2006; Hollanders & Koster, 
2011). According to this model, government spending on wel-
fare state arrangements for the old increases as the population 
ages. While this could mean that the overall level of government 
spending increases, this is often not the case. If it is not possible 
for governments to spend more, they need to reduce spending 
in other domains. This is not to say that the young cannot enjoy 
these provisions, but that they have to wait until they belong to 
the older age group. In that sense, the distribution of age-relat-
ed government provisions can also be seen as the outcome of 
a potential conflict between generations. Now, if the social es-
teem of younger age groups is high, the model predicts that the 
benefactors are willing to support welfare state arrangements 
favoring this age group. As it is not possible to support all age 
groups in society evenly, given budget restrictions, stronger 
support for the welfare state arrangements for the young results 
in less support for provision for the old. Hence, according to this 
model, more social esteem for the young should result in less 
support for welfare state arrangements for the old. The follow-
ing hypothesis reflects this expectation. The higher the perceived 
social esteem of younger age groups, the less support for welfare state 
arrangements	for	the	old	(Hypothesis	2).
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Methods
Data
 Data for this study come from the European Social Survey 
(ESS, 2008), which has been conducted every two years since 
2000. Round 4 of this international comparative survey con-
tains information that allows us to test the hypotheses. The to-
tal dataset investigated here includes the responses of 50,009 
individuals in 29 European countries.
Measures 
 The dependent variable of this study, support for welfare state 
arrangements for the old, is measured by asking respondents about 
their opinion concerning the following question: “How much 
responsibility do you think governments should have to ensure 
a reasonable standard of living for the old?” The answer catego-
ries range from 0 (meaning that the respondents indicate that it 
should not be the governments’ responsibility) to 10 (indicating 
that it should be entirely governments’ responsibility according 
to the respondent). Hence, a higher score reflects more support 
for welfare state arrangements for the old.
 The dependent variables in this study measure the respon-
dent’s perceptions of the perceived social esteem of people in their 
twenties (“the young”) and people over seventy (“the old”). These 
variables are measured as follows. Respondents are asked to 
what extent they think that most people in their country view 
members of the two age groups “as friendly,” “having high 
moral standards,” and “with respect.” These questions do not 
ask about the opinion that respondents have about these two 
groups, but instead measure how they think that their fellow cit-
izens see people in their twenties and those over seventy. Each 
of these questions is measured on a four-point scale, ranging 
from 1 (not at all likely to be viewed that way) to 4 (very likely 
to be viewed that way). As shown in Table 1, the six items can be 
reduced to two dimensions, namely one concerning the social 
esteem of people in their twenties and one measuring the social 
esteem of people over seventy. Two variables are constructed, 
one measuring perceptions about the social esteem of people in 
their twenties (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.79) and one measuring the 
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To take into account that people’s attitudes towards welfare 
state arrangements for the old may be influenced by other 
factors, the analyses controlled for the following background 
variables: gender (0 = male; 1 = female), the respondent’s age (in 
years), years of education, and the main activity of the respondent 
(a variable measuring whether the respondent is in paid work, 
education, unemployed and looking for work, unemployed and 
not looking for work, permanently sick or disabled, retired, 
community or military service, housework, looking after chil-
dren, or other). Furthermore, ideological position is controlled 
for by including a variable measuring left-right self-placement (0 
= left; 10 = right). Finally, since perceptions of social esteem may 
be related to people’s own views about the two age groups, two 
control variables were added measuring feelings about people in 
their 20s and feelings about people over seventy. These variables are 
social esteem of people over seventy (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.73). The 
difference	 in	 social	 esteem is computed by subtracting the score 
on the first variable from the latter, hence indicating how much 
more esteem someone believes that those over seventy have 
compared to those in their twenties.
   Item       1    2
Social esteem of people in their 20s  
 Most people view those in their 20s as friendly 0.768 0.178
 Most people view those in their 20s as having 0.863 0.051
 high moral standards    
 Most people view those in their 20s with respect 0.843 0.103
Social esteem of people over 70  
 Most people view those over 70 as friendly  0.193 0.744
 Most people view those over 70 as having  0.023 0.836
 high moral standards
 Most people view those over 70 with respect  0.109 0.798
Eigenvalue      2.539 1.492
Proportion of variance accounted for                42.312     24.861
Cronbach's alpha        0.78   0.72
Source: European Social Survey Round 4
n = 50,009 individuals in 29 countries
Varimax rotation. Factor loadings > 0.30 in bold.
Table 1. Factor Analysis of Social Esteem Items
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measured by asking respondents the question: “Overall, how 
negative or positive do you feel towards people in their 20s/over 
70?” (0 = extremely negative; 10 = extremely positive). 
Method
 The empirical analysis takes into account that the data have 
a nested structure (individuals are nested in countries). To pro-
vide as much insight as possible, the data are analyzed with 
two different methods. First, an ordinary least squares (OLS) re-
gression analysis is conducted. In this analysis, country dummy 
variables are included to take into account that the measures of 
individuals in one country are not independent. These dum-
mies are included in the analysis, but are not reported in the 
tables to save space. Second, the data are analyzed using multi-
level modeling (Snijders & Bosker, 1999). While this method can 
be used to investigate whether contextual effects at the national 
level explain individual support for welfare state arrangements 
(e.g. Blekesaune & Quadagno, 2003; Jæger, 2006; Koster, 2010), 
it is also a means to take the nested structure of the data into 
account without explicitly focusing on these contextual effects. 
Because the present analysis aims at understanding how in-
dividual perceptions affect support for welfare state arrange-
ments, and not whether these national circumstances matter, 
no contextual effects were added to the model. Instead, by con-
ducting a multilevel analysis, it is acknowledged that responses 
from individuals living in the same country are not indepen-
dent from each other, without explicitly adding explanatory 
variables at the national level. A random intercept model was 
estimated using the MLwiN software package. MLwiN is spe-
cifically designed to perform multilevel analyses. It enables re-
searchers to fit different kinds of multilevel models. The Centre 
for Multilevel Modeling at the University of Bristol developed 
this software package. For the present analyses, version 2.24 
was used (Rasbash, Steele, Browne, & Prosser, 2005).
 In both regressions analyses, four models are estimated. An 
empty model is calculated that serves as a baseline to which the 
next model is compared (Model 0). This next model includes 
the control variables (Model 1). Then two models are calculated 
that include the variables testing the two hypotheses. In the 
OLS regression analyses, the adjusted R2 is used to assess the 
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explained variance of the variable. In multilevel models, it is not 
possible to calculate the explained variance. Instead, for each 
model the -2 log likelihood is estimated. The deviance (the dif-
ference between the -2 log likelihood of two models) indicates 
to what extent the fit of the model improves after including the 
variables. Because the dataset is very large, the significance lev-
els may be inflated. To deal with this, the significance level is set 
at p < 0.0001.  
Results
Descriptive Results
 Table 2 provides an overview of the mean scores on support 
for welfare state arrangements for the old, the perceived social es-
teem of people in their twenties, and the perceived social esteem 
of people over seventy per country. What is particularly notewor-
thy is that the mean level of support for government responsi-
bility for the old is relatively high (m = 8.49). This shows that, on 
average, people are in favor of the government taking action to 
secure the standard of living of the old. For each country in the 
sample, the average score on this variable is above the theoretical 
mean of the scale. The lowest levels of support for welfare state 
arrangement for the old are found in Switzerland (m = 7.23) and 
Germany (m = 7.60) and the respondents in Latvia (m = 9.29) and 
Ukraine (m = 9.39) are most in favor of the idea that the govern-
ment ensures a reasonable standard of living for the old.
 Comparing the average scores on the scales measuring the 
perceived social esteem of people in their twenties and social 
esteem perceptions about people over seventy, Table 2 shows 
that the social esteem of the older age group is perceived to be 
higher than the status of the younger age group (m = 2.20 for 
people in their twenties and m = 3.06 for people over seven-
ty). This difference is consistently found for all countries in the 
sample. Furthermore, the average perceived social esteem of the 
two groups varies across countries. The mean perceived esteem 
of people in their twenties is the lowest in the UK (m = 1.74) 
and the highest in Israel (m = 2.64). In Slovakia, perceived social 
esteem of people over seventy has the lowest value (m = 2.81), 
while in Hungary the perceived social esteem of this group has 
the highest value (m = 3.36).
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Belgium   7.87         2.14              2.95
Bulgaria   9.13         2.02              3.02
Switzerland  7.23         2.08              2.85
Cyprus   8.94         2.56              3.19
Czech Republic  8.22         2.27              2.82
Germany  7.60         1.91              2.92
Denmark  8.31         2.17              3.07
Estonia   8.66         1.97              3.04
Spain   8.84         2.43              3.28
Finland   8.43         2.27              3.20
France   7.94         2.26              2.95
Great Britain  8.53         1.74              3.07
Greece   8.92         2.52              3.25
Croatia   8.70         2.32              2.91
Hungary  8.79         2.00              3.36
Ireland   8.47         2.23              3.35
Israel   8.93         2.64              3.09
Latvia   9.29         2.37              3.05
Netherlands  7.73         1.98              3.14
Norway   8.66         2.19              3.20
Poland   8.60         2.25              3.05
Portugal   8.85         2.55              3.16
Romania   8.04         2.14              2.82
Russian Federation 9.22         1.84              2.86
Sweden   8.49         2.21              3.13
Slovenia   8.34         2.41              3.08
Slovakia   8.37         2.06              2.81
Turkey   8.22         2.48              3.15
Ukraine   9.39         1.90              3.07
Mean   8.49         2.20              3.06
Source: European Social Survey Round 4
n = 50,009 individuals in 29 countries
(a) Item: “How much responsibility do you think governments
should have to ensure a reasonable standard of living for the old?”;
ranging from 0 (should not be the government’s responsibility) to 10
(should be entirely governments responsibility).
(b) Scale score; ranging from 1 to 4.
Table 2. Country Means of Support for Welfare State Arrangements 
for the Old, Perceived Esteem of People in their Twenties, and
Perceived Esteem of People over Seventy
Country
Russian Federation
Support for welfare 
state arrangements 
or the old(a)
Perceived social
esteem of people
in their twenties(b)
Perceived social 
esteem of people
over seventy(b)
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Regression Results 
 The results of the OLS regression are reported in Table 3, 
and Table 4 contains the results of the multilevel regression. 
As Table 4 shows, 8 percent of the variation in support for wel-
fare state arrangements for the old is due to differences across 
countries (Intraclass correlation = 0. 079). This means that coun-
try-level characteristics may play a role in understanding sup-
port for these arrangements, but most of the variance is due to 
variance within countries. The first models reported in Table 3 
and 4 investigate the effects of the individual-level control vari-
ables. The two analyses yield similar results. The size of the pa-
rameters differs only slightly (the only real difference appears 
in the model with the esteem variables; in the OLS regression, 
feelings about people in their 20s becomes significant, while it 
remains not significant in the multilevel regression). The OLS 
regression shows that about 6 percent of variation in attitudes 
towards welfare state arrangements for the old is explained by 
the control variables. The multilevel analysis shows that add-
ing these variables improves the fit of the model (Deviance = 
2,030.478; p < 0.0001). Both models show that support for wel-
fare state arrangements for the old is higher among women, 
older people, those who are lower educated, and people who 
are permanently sick or disabled. People placing themselves 
on the right side of the political scale are less in favor of gov-
ernment responsibility. These outcomes are in line with previ-
ous research findings of general support for the welfare state 
(Blekesaune & Quadagno, 2003; Gërxhani & Koster, 2012). Fur-
thermore, support for welfare state arrangements for the old 
is positively related to the feelings towards people over 70; the 
more positive feeling people have, the higher the support for 
these arrangements.
 The second models reported in Table 3 and Table 4 test the 
two hypotheses. These models investigate how support for wel-
fare state arrangements for the old relate to the perceived social 
esteem of people in their twenties and to perceived social es-
teem of people over seventy. The results from the OLS regres-
sion show that these two variables explain an extra percent of 
variance in welfare state attitudes towards provisions for the 
old (which is statistically significant at the 0.0001 level). The 
multilevel model (Table 4) shows that the fit of the regression 
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                    (1)                   (2) 
      b   (s.e.)    b (s.e.)
Female    0.100 ** (0.017)   0.110 ** (0.017)
Age    0.001 (0.001)   0.001 (0.001)
Years of education  -0.022 ** (0.002)  -0.021 ** (0.002)
Main activity      
 
 Paid work   0.005 (0.066)  -0.004 (0.066)
 Education  -0.110 (0.073)  -0.114 (0.072)
 Unemployed looking for work   0.148 (0.077)   0.133 (0.076)
 Unemployed not looking for work   0.152 (0.091)   0.156 (0.091)
 Permanently sick or disabled    0.268 (0.085)   0.256 (0.084)
 Retired   0.074 (0.070)   0.079 (0.070)
 Community or military service    0.227 (0.206)   0.223 (0.204)
 Housework, looking after children  -0.102 (0.071)  -0.112 (0.071)
 Other     ---    (---)    ---    (---)
Left-right self-placement   -0.034 ** (0.004)   -0.036 ** (0.004)
Feelings about people in their 20s   0.019 (0.005)   0.027 ** (0.005)
Feelings about people of 70   0.199 ** (0.005)   0.165 ** (0.005)
     and older     
 
Perceived status people in their 20s     -0.046 ** (0.011)
Perceived status people of 70     0.285 ** (0.013)
     and older     
 
Intercept    6.715 (0.091)   6.899 (0.130)
      
Adjusted R2   0.060    0.071  
R2 change     0.011  
F Change                                                        190.011 **                             256.878 **  
        
Source: European Social Survey Round 4
n = 50,009 individuals in 29 countries
Unstandardized coefficients are reported
The models include country dummies (not reported)
*p < 0.01; ** p < 0.001
Table 3. OLS Regression Analysis of Support for 
Welfare State Arrangements for the Old
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               (1)                  (2) 
    b    (s.e.)     b    (s.e.)
Female    0.065 **  (0.017)   0.074 **  (0.017)
Age     0.001  (0.001)   0.001  (0.001)
Years of education  -0.021 **  (0.002)   -0.020 **  (0.002)
Main activity       
 Paid work   0.002  (0.074)   -0.009  (0.072)
 Education  -0.090  (0.080)   -0.088  (0.078)
 Unemployed looking for work   0.100  (0.084)   0.093  (0.082)
 Unemployed not looking for work   0.081  (0.098)   0.092  (0.095)
 Permanently sick or disabled    0.261  (0.091)   0.255  (0.089)
 Retired   0.064  (0.079)   0.067  (0.076)
 Community or military service   -0.043  (0.211)   -0.029  (0.203)
 Housework, looking after children  -0.022  (0.069)   0.023  (0.076)
 Other      ---     (---)     ---    (---)
Left-right self-placement   -0.043 **  (0.004)   -0.045 **  (0.004)
Feelings about people in their 20s   0.005  (0.005)   0.016  (0.005)
Feelings about people of 70 and older   0.186 **  (0.005)   0.155 **  (0.005)
      
Perceived status people in their 20s   -0.064 **  (0.011)
Perceived status people of 70 and older   0.264 **  (0.013)
      
Intercept     7.352  (0.128)   6.829  (0.130)
      
Deviance                                                             2030.478 **                         433.970 **  
Variance country level   0.221     0.213  
Variance individual level   2.718     2.691  
Intraclass correlation    0.075     0.073  
Source: European Social Survey Round 4
n = 50,009 individuals in 29 countries
Empty model: -2log likelihood = 166277.870; Intraclass correlation = 0.079
*p < 0.01; **p < 0.001
Table 4. Multilevel Analysis of Support for
Welfare State Arrangements for the Old
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model significantly increases after adding these two variables 
(Deviance = 433.970; p < 0.0001). Perceived social esteem of peo-
ple in their twenties is negatively related to support for welfare 
state arrangements for the old (b = - 0.046; p < 0.0001 and b = 
-0.064; p < 0.0001, respectively) and perceived social esteem of 
people over seventy is positively related to this welfare state at-
titude (b = 0.285; p < 0.0001; b = 0.264; p < 0.0001). These findings 
support the two hypotheses derived from the social esteem the-
ory of solidarity. First, support for welfare state arrangements 
for the old is positively related to perceived social esteem of the 
elderly. Secondly, levels of support are negatively related to the 
perceived social esteem of the young. 
Discussion and Conclusion
 The present study extends previous investigations of public 
attitudes towards welfare state arrangements. Besides the exist-
ing explanations that focus on characteristics of the benefactor, 
characteristics of the beneficiaries, the relationship between cit-
izens and the government, and the social context of individuals, 
the study presented here shows that the relationship between 
beneficiaries matters. The theoretical approach and empirical 
outcomes have a number of theoretical and practical implica-
tions that may be further expanded in future research.
 Theoretically, the proposed model has the following impli-
cations. First, it shows that the welfare state can be thought of 
as a number of collective action problems that need to be solved 
to generate support. While this has been previously noted, for 
example in the literature about contingent consent (Levi, 1997; 
Rothstein, 2001), the approach taken here differs from these ear-
lier accounts in one respect. The main addition to the previous 
work is that the collective action problem among citizens can be 
further elaborated by distinguishing the group of benefactors 
from the group of beneficiaries. As a consequence, the attention 
shifts from the social dilemma involving all citizens to the di-
lemma faced by the contributors to the collective good. 
 A second addition and extension concerns the approach of 
the relationships between citizens. While earlier accounts em-
phasize generalized trust, the model investigated in this study 
focuses on more specific information about the attitudes that 
fellow citizens have toward the group of beneficiaries. Instead 
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of concentrating on the deservingness criteria that citizens 
themselves apply (Van Oorschot, 2006), people also seem to take 
into account the criteria that their fellow citizens apply. At least, 
this is what may be derived from the social esteem model. 
 The empirical findings imply that future research on wel-
fare state attitudes (and attitudes towards government policies 
in general) need to be more specific about who is willing to con-
tribute to what and how informational cues can explain such 
solidarity. With regard to the existence of multiple social dilem-
mas, a further extension of Rothstein’s (2001) model may be re-
quired to fully capture the relevant relationships. Distinguish-
ing between the government, benefactors, and beneficiaries also 
means that it is not only the question whether the benefactors 
view the government as a trustworthy actor, but also raises the 
question of under what conditions the beneficiaries believe that 
the government will act in their best interest. Taken together, it 
is suggested that future work should investigate these different 
social dilemmas, as well as qualitative and informational as-
pects of the relationships between the different actors.
 There are several issues that could not be examined in the 
present study and that need to be addressed in future studies. 
One of the main assumptions of the model is that social esteem 
perceptions serve as informational cues to solve collective ac-
tion problems. Although this is also suggested in previous re-
search, other (additional or alternative) mechanisms play a role. 
For example, while the information argument holds that the 
costs for contributing decrease, this rational approach to soli-
darity can be complemented by arguments concerning imita-
tion or the customs that citizens follow within society. 
 What is more, additional research can examine whether in-
formation, imitations, and customs provide the basis for norms 
and sanctions that can further strengthen the willingness to 
contribute to a collective good. Determining which of these 
mechanisms explains the willingness to support welfare state 
arrangements requires other data than what was investigated 
here. These data can be gathered using a survey across coun-
tries like the one investigated here, but it is worthwhile to con-
sider other data-gathering techniques, such as (vignette) exper-
iments to distinguish the different mechanisms and investigate 
their relative importance.
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 This study started with the question of how to explain at-
titudes towards welfare state arrangements for the old. The in-
vestigation shows that, apart from the existing explanations, 
the social esteem of the elderly explains these attitudes. The 
practical implication of this finding is that, from the perspective 
of social policy, governments may have the means to generate 
support for provisions aimed at securing the living conditions 
of the old. While a common strategy would be to generate such 
support by emphasizing the value and importance of such pro-
visions, governments can also choose to focus on mechanisms 
that help to overcome social dilemmas. The feasibility of such a 
strategy is cannot be answered with the present study and re-
quires additional research examining the effectiveness of such 
interventions. From a social research perspective on welfare 
state arrangements for the old, the present study shows that the 
future of such provision not only depends on whether it serves 
the best interest of individuals, whether the elderly are viewed 
as deserving, and whether the governments is regarded legiti-
mate, but also on the social esteem of the elderly.
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